"for whose benefit and at whose expense should the firm be managed?" (Freeman, 1994:67) . But the essence of the corporation is the competitive claims made of it by diverse stakeholders. It is a fact of business life that different stakeholders have different and often conflicting expectations of a corporation. Indeed, the firm itself can be said to be an invention to allow such conflict to be discovered, surfaced, and resolved, because conflicting claims have to be discovered and methods for resolution executed.
This inherent conflict is a feature not only of the established giant corporation, but also of the very act of creation of the productive enterprise. Rarely do giant corporations begin their life as widely held joint-stock companies. All corporations can be traced back to entrepreneurial beginnings or to the gleam in the eye of an entrepreneur and to the efforts of these individuals at creating a firm. Entrepreneurship involves joint production where several different stakeholders have to be brought together to create the new product or service (Shane and Venkataraman, 1997) . The creative task of the entrepreneur is to identify, assemble and institutionalize the joint production function in a way that meaningful surplus is created.
In a typical scenario, the entrepreneur does not own or control all the resources required to develop the market, establish the value-chain infrastructure, and eventually profit from his or her particular knowledge. Most of these resources have to come from other people or institutions. Thus, the entrepreneur has to assemble, organize and execute the market development and value-chain infrastructure before potential profits can be realized and conjectures proven to be "insights". The process of creating products and markets implies that much of the information required by potential stakeholdersfor example, technology, price, quantity, tastes, supplier networks, distributor networks, and strategy are not reliably available. Relevant information will only exist once the market has been successfully created (Arrow, 1974) . Potential stakeholders thus have to rely on the entrepreneur for information, but without the benefit of the entrepreneur's "insight". Thus, decisions about all aspects of the firm, its future and stakeholders participation have to be made behind the classic "veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1971) .
The seeds of potential conflicts between stakeholders are sown right at the inception of the firm, at the very forging of the joint production function. It could be argued that without fundamentally different expectations and interpretations about the future, there is no need or opportunity for the firm to exist in the first place. The firm owes its very existence, at least in large part, to the differing information bases and expectations of the stakeholders.
A major insight of the stakeholder theory is that the firm is an equilibrating mechanism and not a governance mechanism.
1 It deflects attention from a coordinating role for the manager to that of an arbitrator. There is a subtle but significant difference to viewing the firm and its decision-makers as responsible for equilibration rather than governing. The skills, mind-set, and character required of a governor are as different from that required of an equilibrator, as the skills, mind-set and character required of an attorney representing a client are different from a judge adjudicating between the rights and claims of competing agents (and their principals).
If indeed, the firm is an equilibrating mechanism, then questions such as "what are the properties of a fair and efficient equilibrating mechanism" and "what alternative mechanisms would render the firm an effective reconciler of competing claims", become crucial within the theory. I interpret the stakeholder literature to offer three alternative mechanisms to ensure a fair and efficient equilibrating system. One is embodied in a person (the moral manager), one is embodied in a process (the bargaining process), and one is embodied in an external (to the firm) institution (the visible hand of law and government). To these three I add a fourth mechanism from an entrepreneurship perspective.
The Moral Manager:
The argument here is that since the manager or decisionmaker is responsible for adjudicating current and potential conflicts rather than interpreting and enforcing pre-existing, well-established set of rules and routines, the necessary qualifications for the reconciler is strong moral character. Carroll (1995: ) captures the essential requirement for such a moral manager thus: they are "exemplars of "good guys". Moral managers employ and adhere to ethical norms, which reflect high standards of right behavior. Moral managers not only conform to accepted high levels of professional conduct, they also frequently exhibit ethical leadership…. Moral managers strive to operate well above and beyond what the law mandates. Sound moral principles such as justice, rights, utilitarianism and the Golden Rule are employed for decisionmaking and conduct."
Moral managers consider "stakeholders maximally because stakeholders possess intrinsic worth in and of themselves; that is they are ends and not means" (Carroll, 1995:) . The odds that a firm will act as a fair equilibrator increases considerably because
(1) the morality of top managers will be reflected in the system of incentives and sanctions employed by the firm; (2) the firm will be populated by moral managers through a process of imitation, learning and self-modeling; and finally (3) self-selection (Clinard, 1983; Jones, 1995; and Lee and Mitchell, 1994) .
The Bargaining Process 2 : Central to the process view is the conception of the "value-creation activity as a contractual process among those parties affected" (Freeman, 1994: ) . Thus the firm is a nexus of multilateral contracts where equilibration occurs over time through a process of bargaining among the various resource owners and stakeholders in the firm. In this respect the firm can be seen as a clearing house for potentially conflicting stakeholder claims, and the story of the evolution of the firm is the evolution of stakes (where participants make risky investments) and the evolution of claims. The bargaining process is a dynamic one of give and take over time, all occurring within a mutually accepted framework of reconciliation rules. For, at the coordinating node is a set of reconciliation rules that are developed behind a Rawlsian "veil-ofignorance" and embody legal notions of "fair contract" (Freeman and Evan, 1990) .
Conflicts, especially about ex-post distributions, are an integral part of the valuecreation process. Thus, emphasis is placed on the procedural aspects of multiple stakeholder coordination rather than upon the results of value-creating activity itself or upon the specific outcomes of the bargaining process (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) .
The odds that a firm will act as a fair equilibrator increases considerably because each stakeholder has equal rights to bargain and is protected equally under the system.
However, crucial to the working of the process view is the replacement of the very purpose of the firm from serving stockholder interest to serving stakeholder interests.
role to one of mere governance. Stakeholder theory is attempting to rescue the firm from this confinement.
Unless a change in the worldview comes about, neither will the "separation thesis" be abandoned nor will the institutions of law embrace the role of the firm as an equilibrator rather than a governor in the interest of the stockholder. I am personally skeptical that reconciliation rules idea will be widely accepted as a practical solution. However, I sense that many in the field believe (and indeed some have taken up the onerous task) that this change in worldview can be brought about "plank by plank" through an intellectual "rebuilding of the corporate ship, while it remains afloat".
The Visible Hand 3 : The argument for a visible hand is an old and familiar one, and so I do not wish to spend much time on it. In the event that the moral manager and/or the bargaining process do not satisfactorily perform the job of equilibration, there is need for a countervailing force, in the form of an external visible hand. While Evan and Freeman (1990) require a moral manager to avoid stakeholder problems, this view augments management with an external creator and enforcer of laws to overcome problems that may arise due to information asymmetries, moral hazards, and negative externalities, even if actions were taken in good faith (Hill and Jones, 1992) . Thus, we would have reporting requirements, monitoring agencies, enforcement agencies, etc., overseeing the activities of the central coordinators of the firm.
Together, these three mechanisms will ensure that the firm is a fair and efficient equilibrating institution, where no party is used as a means to some other party's ends.
The corporation would be managed for the benefit and at the expense of all stakeholders to the enterprise. There continues to be a debate in the literature over the exact qualification to be a stakeholder (See Mitchell, et. al. 1997 for a survey), and whether the prescribed mechanisms indeed lead to fair and efficient resolution to stakeholder problems. At least one pair of writers has argued that the stakeholder arguments are generally biased towards fairness at the expense of efficiency (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) . In my own view these are largely empirical questions to be settled with more careful argumentation and accumulating evidence. The greater challenge for proponents of stakeholder theory is to show that the prescribed forms can come into existence, do indeed come into existence, and are evolutionarily robust, that is, they can survive and flourish in a competitive market place of alternative forms. Otherwise, the theory runs the risk of being of merely academic interest.
A major contribution of the stakeholder theory to entrepreneurship is the broadening of the reason for the existence of a firm. It deflects attention from the firm merely meeting narrow, conventional economic and financial criteria of the founding entrepreneurs to a broader one of satisfying multiple stakeholder interests. 4 Meeting a broader social charter would constitute the ultimate test of firm performance. I have myself argued elsewhere (Venkataraman, 1997 ) that a preoccupation of entrepreneurship researchers with financial success of individual entrepreneurs and firms misses the point of the very existence of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is concerned with the discovery and exploitation of profitable opportunities for private wealth accumulation and as a consequence for social wealth creation as well. Therefore, the relevant benchmarks for entrepreneurship are (1) the absolute level of economic performance that provides a return for enterprising effort, and (2) Wood and Jones, 1995) .
The field of entrepreneurship, in turn, has some insights to offer stakeholder theory. If indeed equilibration is a major role of the firm, then stakeholder theory has neglected one powerful source of such equilibration, namely, the entrepreneurial discovery process. The very process of entrepreneurial discovery serves as a fair and efficient mechanism to reconcile conflicting stakeholder claims.
The Entrepreneurial Process Perspective:
6 From an entrepreneurship perspective the central question of stakeholder theory, namely, "for whose benefit and at whose expense should the firm be managed?" is moot. The central assertion of the entrepreneurial process is that, even if the fiduciary duty of the manager is to the stockholder, the process of entrepreneurial discovery and exploitation will ensure that the corporation will be managed as if for the benefit of all the stakeholders to the enterprise.
7
Firms which are not so managed, will, over time, be selected out of the business (and, therefore, social) landscape. While this process may not happen instantaneously, or even in some direct fashion, the process of entrepreneurial discovery and exploitation will eventually force fair and efficient reconciliation of competing stakeholder claims in firms in general and in each firm in question.
This equilibration process works in two ways: equilibrating the value anomaly stakeholder by stakeholder and by bringing about a fundamental change in a complete system of stakeholders. I call these, respectively, the weak equilibrating process and the strong equilibrating process. The strong equilibrating process overcomes some of the 6 I am deliberately using the phrase entrepreneurial process rather than market process because I wish to contrast my use of the process from the more mainstream conception of the perfectly competitive market process. I refer to a process where it is at best tending towards equilibrium and never really there. It is a world filled with actors who are liable to make errors, are sometimes ignorant, sometimes ignorant about their ignorance, sometimes brilliant, but mostly prosaic, sometimes knowingly deceitful, but mostly well intentioned, and most important of all, boundedly rational. The process has scope for genuine discovery, genuine disappointment, or pleasant surprise. This is in stark contrast to the "equilibrium-always approach" with instantaneously optimizing actors, who are exceptionally well informed and never commit an error, operating in instantly clearing markets. 7 I am aware that there is a current debate in the stakeholder field about isntrumental vs. normative views of stakeholder theory. Although I find this distinction limitations of the weak process. The weak equilibrating process holds that whenever a stakeholder justifiably believes that the value supplied by him or her to a firm is more than the value received, the entrepreneurial process will redeploy the resources of the "victimized" stakeholder to an use where value supplied and received will be equilibrated. The strong equilibrating process holds that if the redeployment of individual stakeholders does not work freely and efficiently 8 , and serious value anomalies accumulate within firms and societies, the entrepreneurial process will destroy the value anomalies by fundamental rearrangements in how resources and stakeholders are combined.
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Weak Equilibrating Process:
In an important paper called "The use of knowledge in society" Hayek (1945) pointed out that in any collective, equilibration has to be brought about under circumstances where the knowledge required to bring about such equilibration exists neither concentrated in some integrated form nor is "given" to a single mind. Rather such knowledge exists as "dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess" (Hayek, 1945: 519) .
The dispersion of information among different people who do not have access to the same observations, interpretations or experiences has two fundamental implications for the firm as an equilibrating mechanism. First, it is physically impossible for the value of all resources in a firm to be in balance at any given time, that is, exist in a state of 8 The sources of such friction are too numerous to isolate individually. 9 Such recombination may occur through invention of new products, new organizational forms, new processes of production, transportation, and communication, new markets, and new ways of organizing life in societies. 10 Both the weak and strong processes may operate with some lag because value anomalies have to be discovered and are not always given. The strong process may operate with significant lag because equilibrium. Thus, in most firms most of the time some resource owners will not get their due. 11 Second, the existence of these inefficiencies is a known source of profit for those alert individuals who can discover and eliminate value inequities.
Value inequities or anomalies represent entrepreneurial opportunities for individuals. By definition whenever there is an asymmetry in beliefs about the value of a resource (say between the value supplier and those who receive it, i.e., the firm) there exists inefficiency. Inefficiencies are a major incentive for alert individuals seeking to profit from them, and the central feature of a free market system is the abundant supply of such alert profit-seeking entrepreneurs (Kirzner, 1985) .
I define, for this purpose, an entrepreneur as one who realizes or conjectures (either through genuine insight and knowledge, or through mere luck) that some resources are underutilized in their current occupation and recombines them into potentially a more useful and fruitful combination. Such redeployment goes on all the time in a market economy and plays three important roles from stakeholder theory perspective. First, they provide important information about the competitive value of alternative resources. Value inequities or anomalies can often be discovered only in reference to some external benchmark, and the entrepreneurial process provides this important information to the stakeholders, from which they can recognize the presence of inequities. Second, the competition for resources from opportunity-seeking entrepreneurs potentially forces managers to act as if each stakeholder is an end unto himself or herself and not a means to others' ends. Third, the entrepreneurial process can provide a viable anomalies have to accumulate to a significant threshold level before innovation becomes a worthwhile endeavor.
exit route for victimized stakeholders. The first principle that Freeman (1994) postulates for a fair bargaining process within the firm is the principle of entry and exit. According to Freeman clearly defined exit conditions are vital to a fair contract entered into behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance". But this only begs the question "exit to what" and "who provides viable alternatives". Without viable alternatives to exit to, a clearly defined condition of exit is no condition at all. The entrepreneurial process provides the alternatives necessary for exit.
Strong Equilibrating Force:
The weak equilibrating force is a necessary but not sufficient condition for solving stakeholder anomalies in firms. Hayek's insight about the dispersion of information in any collective suggests that ignorance, error, and more importantly, ignorance about one's ignorance is part of the system itself. The "manager of a firm, like any individual in the market, will be ignorant of his/her own ignorance with respect to opportunities" and problems in the firm (Sautet and Foss, 1998 ) -the double Hayekian knowledge problem (Sautet and Foss, 1998) . The presence of ignorance has two other important implications: (1) there is scope for genuine novelty in the marketplace, or as Sautet and Foss (1998) express it, the economy is open-ended; and (2) individuals can imagine a future and act to make it happen. The presence of ignorance, error, novelty and genuine surprise means that the system will only tend towards equilibrium and never really attain perfect equilibrium (Kirzner, 1979; . In other words, there will always be some individuals or groups who will be used as means to someone else's ends.
Indeed, it may not even be desirable to have perfect stakeholder equilibration. Schumpeter (1976: 83) forcefully argued, "[a] system -any system, economic or otherthat at every point of time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to a system that does so at no given point in time, because the latter's failure to do so may be a condition for the level or speed of long-run performance." Schumpeter is referring to our ability to leap frog to a qualitatively superior quality of life for all. Brenner (1983) has offered the provocative hypothesis that grave inequalities (and perhaps inequities) in a system is potentially a great motivator, for the only human way in which those at the bottom of society can rise is to take extraordinary gambles. This in turn may be good for society because extraordinary leaps are possible in social, technical, and economic development.
Historically, people in many societies have accepted significant disparities in fortunes and wealth, especially in free and democratic societies where people are confident that the disparities are outcomes of a fair process, a la Rawls. But often, there are systematic local problems, both in outcomes and in the working of the weak equilibrating force. Stakeholder inequities in some sections of the economy (for example the giant widely-held corporation) may accumulate and may be spread over a large spectrum of stakeholders. Moreover, such inequities may persist for non-trivial periods.
The sources of such accumulation and persistence may be several. First, because the weak force harbors errors and ignorance, stakeholder inequities may never be discovered in the first place. Second, even if these inequities are discovered, the affected group may be fragmented, or cannot coalesce into a concentrated power capable of changing the current order. Third, even if the victimized stakeholder groups are concentrated, there may be significant asymmetry in relative power and so they are powerless to alter the status quo. Fourth, even if power is not an issue, the stakeholders are so dispersed that their problems are economically unattractive for the entrepreneurial process to solve.
Fifth, there may be conflicts of interests, lack of fairness, and a lack of ethics in those that are aware of and can correct the inequities. Finally, there may be willful desire to do harm on the part of some.
The persistence of accumulated inequities calls not for incremental change through the weak force, but for a fundamental qualitative change of the kind Schumpeter It is important to appreciate here that while this process has been incessant, the innovations themselves occur in what Schumpeter (1976: 83) what we know as business cycles. Schumpeter's observation calls for patience and recommends giving the evolutionary process of entrepreneurship and innovation a chance to make changes from within rather than rushing to make changes from without by resorting to some form of visible hand. 13 In short, if the giant, widely held corporation truly represents an unfair and/or inefficient organizational form, then business history suggests that somewhere, somehow, some entrepreneurs will arise to introduce innovative products, methods, and forms that will inevitably destroy this form by creatively replacing it with a qualitatively superior form. 14 When we are dealing with an organic process, analysis of what happens in any particular part of it -say in the giant corporation -or even at a particular time period -say the post World War II periodmay indeed clarify details of the mechanism but is inconclusive beyond that. "Every piece of business strategy acquires true significance only against the background of that process and within the situation created by it" (Schumpeter, 1976: 83-84) .
The weak and strong equilibrating forces have several implications for both, stakeholder theory and entrepreneurship research. First, stakeholder theory needs to consider the entrepreneurial process as a legitimate method of bringing about stakeholder equilibration. The repertoire of the theory must be increased to include (in addition to the moral manager, the fair bargaining process, and the visible hand) the weak and strong entrepreneurial equilibrating forces. Without these forces within its framework the theory is simply incomplete. Similarly, entrepreneurship theory must consider stakeholder 13 This is not to say a visible hand is not required, only that its use must be very carefully considered. There are numerous instances (especially where transaction costs of using the market processes are high) where the visible hand of law and government or some other countervailing force may be the best alternative. 14 In contemporary times, one could argue that the rise of the Internet has done precisely this and has radically altered the relative bargaining powers of different stakeholder groups. equilibration explicitly. Entrepreneurship research is, in turn, incomplete without this consideration.
Second, we need to undertake the challenging task of understanding the specific ways in which the weak and strong forces bring about equilibration, both in theory and in practice. Many of the arguments for the competitive entrepreneurial process remain theoretical speculations, ideological assertions, or rhetorical orations. The challenging empirical work is yet to be undertaken in a systematic and persuasive manner. Third, if
we are persuaded by the arguments for the entrepreneurial process in bringing about stakeholder equilibration, then more systematic work is required to understand and implement the institutions, conditions, and the rules of the games that promote such entrepreneurship. To borrow a phrase from the late Mancur Olson, the need is for entrepreneurship augmenting firms, governments, and societies (Arrow, et. al., 1999) .
Finally, not all entrepreneurship is good. Enterprising individuals may devote their energy, time, and attention to productive, unproductive and criminal (where some get richer necessarily at the expense of others) entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990) . This empirical demonstration of the validity of the stakeholder idea by life-and-blood entrepreneurs is perhaps the most efficient and effective way of diffusing the stakeholder innovation, for nothing diffuses as quickly as success. To paraphrase Freeman (1994: ) the weakly equilibrating entrepreneur has the potential to rebuild the ship of stakeholders', plank by plank, while it still remains afloat. 15 When the efforts of this entrepreneur is inadequate, a "gale force of creative destruction" unleashed by an innovating entrepreneur will sink the unfair and inefficient corporate ship while evacuating all stakeholders to the safety of a new vessel -provided we give the entrepreneurial process its time and chance to act. 15 The original quote is rightly attributed to Neurath.
